Atkins Puts Executive Pay Disclosure Squarely in Governance Crosshairs

As boards prepare for a new proxy season, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Paul Atkins is making clear that executive compensation disclosure—long a flashpoint for directors and investors alike—sit at the center of his regulatory agenda.

In recent speeches, including remarks delivered February 17, 2026, at a corporate law symposium hosted by Texas A&M University at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Atkins signaled a shift toward a leaner, more principles‑based disclosure framework, one that would recalibrate what companies are expected to disclose about pay decisions and why.

For boards and management, the message is less about deregulation writ large and more about re‑anchoring compensation disclosure to boardroom realities and investor decision‑usefulness.

Materiality Over Mandate

At the core of Atkins’ agenda is a renewed emphasis on materiality—a concept he has described as the SEC’s “north star” for disclosure reform. In Texas, he questioned whether current rules that require detailed compensation disclosure for up to seven executives reflect what is material to shareholders or, instead, whether they reflect decades of regulatory accretion.

That critique resonates directly with compensation committees, which often approve pay programs for a small number of key executives while devoting significant resources to complying with expansive tabular and narrative requirements. Atkins suggested that disclosure obligations should be calibrated to their cost and relevance, rather than applied uniformly regardless of an executive’s material impact on the company.

Pay‑Versus‑Performance: A Governance Pain Point

Among the disclosure regimes most squarely in Atkins’ sights is pay‑versus‑performance (PvP). In his Texas remarks, he singled out PvP as an example of a rule that fails both boards and investors, describing it as overly complex and difficult to interpret without specialized expertise.

The criticism goes beyond the compliance burden. PvP has become a focal point for proxy advisors and activist investors, even as many directors question whether the mandated metrics reflect how boards evaluate management’s performance. Atkins’ comments suggest an openness to revisiting whether PvP disclosure advances informed voting — or merely adds noise to the proxy statement.

Those concerns were echoed at the SEC’s executive compensation roundtable last year, where panelists debated whether the benefits of PvP disclosure justify its cost and complexity. [Read Farient’s comment letter in advance of the roundtable.]

Reframing Executive ‘Perks’ for Modern Risk

Atkins also highlighted the treatment of executive security arrangements as an area where disclosure rules lag current governance realities. In Texas, he questioned whether personal security should continue to be characterized as a “perquisite,” noting that the business and risk environment facing senior executives has evolved significantly since those rules were adopted.

For boards, this issue has practical implications. Classifying security expenses as perks can distort headline pay figures and complicate say‑on‑pay outcomes, even when such measures are driven by legitimate risk considerations. Atkins’ comments suggest the Commission may reconsider whether existing disclosure categories accurately reflect board intent and fiduciary judgment.

Pulling Back From ‘Governance by Disclosure’

Beyond executive pay, Atkins has used compensation disclosure as an entry point to critique what he views as “disclose or explain” requirements that indirectly pressure boards toward preferred governance structures. He cited elements of Regulation S‑K that require companies to justify deviations from perceived best practices, characterizing them as a form of “regulation by shaming.”

That framing is likely to resonate with directors who argue that governance decisions should reflect company‑specific circumstances rather than one‑size‑fits‑all expectations embedded in disclosure rules.

What Boards Should Watch

Although Atkins has not outlined a formal rulemaking timetable, his repeated focus on compensation disclosure — across multiple venues — signals that executive pay is likely to see meaningful reform.

The takeaway is not immediate relief but anticipatory. Boards may soon face a disclosure regime that places greater weight on judgment, materiality, and narrative clarity — and less on tabulation. That shift could alter how compensation committees think about documenting decisions, engaging with investors, and proxy advisory scrutiny.

As Atkins framed it, the goal is not less disclosure, but better disclosure—aligned with how boards govern and how investors decide. Whether that vision translates into concrete rules change will be a central governance question in the year ahead.