The SEC Proposes Sweeping Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform – Farient’s View and What Boards Should Do Next

November 18, 2026

The SEC has moved from discussion to proposed rulemaking. On November 13, 2026, the Commission proposed a broad overhaul of Item 402 of Regulation S-K intended to make executive compensation disclosure more principles-based, concise, and focused on material information, while reducing compliance burdens. Key changes include: (1) fewer named executive officers (NEOs); (2) a new framework distinguishing compensation granted from compensation earned in place of the Summary Compensation Table (SCT); (3) a more principles-based Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A); (4) a reduced Pay versus Performance (PvP) disclosure with a new definition of realized (“earned”) pay; (5) greater flexibility on perquisites reporting; and (6) simplified CEO Pay Ratio, clawback, and other compensation disclosures.

Key Takeaways

  • The SEC proposal shifts disclosure from comparability to strategy linkage. Today’s rules are built around prescribed tables and data points that let investors compare companies. The proposal asks companies to link their pay programs to their strategy, rather than emphasizing comparability
  • Disclosures will be less prescribed; they will involve greater judgment and more robust shareholder engagement. Newly available discretion across various areas of disclosure will put the burden on Boards to document defensible rationales for their decisions. As a result, Boards and investors alike will want to double down on their engagement efforts to ensure clarity and understanding
  • Proxy advisors, investors, and some consultants are likely to push back. The changes will make comparative analysis more difficult. Some consultants, as well as proxy advisors and investors, have built their evaluations around existing disclosures and will likely argue against many of the proposed reforms that allow for fewer or non-standardized disclosures. While many of the proposals will be controversial, we expect that most will be implemented

The opportunity in this proposal is not simply to say less, but to say what matters.

The Proposal Was Expected

The last time the SEC made sweeping changes to executive compensation disclosures was 20 years ago (in 2006), when it introduced the CD&A and redesigned the SCT and other related disclosures for comparability across companies. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 further added requirements, including Say on Pay (SOP), the CEO Pay Ratio disclosure, the PvP disclosure, and clawbacks. The SEC’s latest 2026 proposal now seeks to simplify and rationalize the stack of items that public companies are now required to disclose.

The proposal delivered on expectations. In June 2025, the SEC convened a roundtable on executive compensation disclosure, followed by more than 70 comment letters. Farient’s article, “From Patchwork to Progress? SEC Roundtable Signals Shift in Executive Pay Disclosure,” noted that simplification and investor usefulness were central themes. We predicted that the question would not be whether the SEC would revisit the framework, but how far it would go. Farient CEO Robin Ferracone attended the roundtable, and Farient later submitted two comment letters advocating targeted reforms. Notably, the SEC’s proposal cites Farient’s views from our comment letters and white papers in several places, including those on perquisites, the SCT, PvP, and CEO Pay Ratio disclosures.

While the SEC’s proposal is broad, there are certain areas in which the agency did not go as far as some expected, and other areas in which its changes were more aggressive than anticipated. For example, the SEC did not do away with the mandatory CEO Pay Ratio or the PvP disclosures because they are statutorily required to retain some form of these provisions. In contrast, the SEC was more aggressive than expected with its proposals on perquisites disclosure and in its elimination of entire standalone disclosures. Overall, the SEC is proposing to adopt, in some form, most of the changes that were on the table.

Once the final rule is released, required implementation will likely begin with the 2029 proxies for calendar year reporting companies. This will give issuers 2027 and 2028 to plan for the changes and determine whether they want to opt in for 2028.

What the SEC is Proposing

1. Reduce required pay disclosures to only the CEO and CFO, meaning there are two Named Executive Officers (NEOs) in most cases, not five

Perhaps the most significant change in the proposal is to limit NEOs to those who served as CEO or CFO during the fiscal year. For most companies, that cuts the required population from five or more executives to two. Companies could voluntarily include others in the proposed compensation tables, if desired.

Farient’s view: we support this change, but we expect pushback from investors, proxy advisors, and some consultants

Proxy data is currently being used in ways for which it was never designed. Some companies, consultants, and executives use proxy data to benchmark compensation. This approach works for the CEO and CFO positions, which are required to be included in all proxies; however, it is unreliable for other roles, since such roles can only be matched by title and such data is only for the highest paid executives in the market, which upwardly biases the pay data.

Thus, the SEC proposal is likely to be constructive as some companies will switch to using survey rather than proxy data for other executive roles.

Some argue that eliminating disclosed NEOs in the proxy will reduce transparency around succession and its leadership bench. However, each company will have the opportunity to disclose, if desired, information around these issues. This is better than asking readers to infer talent planning strategies by using NEO pay data.

2. Replace the Summary Compensation Table with a more intuitive view of granted and earned pay

The SEC acknowledges that the SCT mixes apples and oranges. It combines the value of actual non-equity incentive pay with the grant date value of the equity, not the value of equity actually earned for performance achieved. Therefore, the SEC proposes replacing today’s primary executive compensation tables with three new tables: an Earned Compensation Table, a Granted Compensation Table, and a Status of Equity Awards Table.

The Earned Compensation Table would capture outcomes, such as cash short- and long-term incentives when they are earned, stock awards when they are vested, and options when they are exercised. The Granted Compensation Table would show the year’s compensation opportunity, generally at target values. A third table would track individual equity awards through their lifecycle, bridging granted and earned pay.

Illustrative examples of each table are shown in the Exhibit.

Exhibit: Illustrative Examples of the SEC’s Proposed Compensation Tables

Table 1: Earned Compensation

This table is intended to answer: What compensation did the executive actually earn or realize during the year? Stock is counted when it vests, while options are counted when exercised, regardless of when the awards were originally granted.

Earned Compensation Table

Name / Position Year Salary Earned Non-Equity Awards Earned Stock Awards Vested Options Exercised Misc. Compensation Total Compensation Earned
Doe, Jane
(CEO)
2027 $1,650,000 $4,200,000 $5,342,862 $14,000,000 $200,000 $25,392,862
2026 $1,550,000 $6,975,000 $1,323,072 $0 $200,000 $10,048,072
2025 $1,450,000 $7,400,000 $10,500,000 $0 $200,000 $19,550,000

Table 2: Granted Compensation

This table is intended to answer a different question: What (target) compensation opportunity did the Board provide? Salary is annualized as of fiscal year-end, non-equity awards generally appear at target, and equity is reported at the grant-date fair value assuming target performance is achieved on performance-based equity.

Granted Compensation Table

Name / Position Year Annualized Salary Non-Equity Awards Granted Stock Awards Granted Option Awards Granted Total Compensation Granted
Doe, Jane
(CEO)
2027 $1,700,000 $4,500,000 $4,700,000 $4,700,000 $15,600,000
2026 $1,600,000 $10,200,000 $4,600,000 $4,600,000 $21,000,000
2025 $1,500,000 $4,000,000 $4,500,000 $4,500,000 $14,500,000

Table 3: Status of Equity Awards

This table serves as the bridge between the Granted and Earned Compensation tables. It tracks each equity award over its lifecycle, noting when it was granted, when the performance and vesting periods end, and each award’s current status – i.e., how much has vested or has been exercised.

Status of Equity Awards Table

Name / Position Equity Award Terms Equity Award Status
Grant Date Award Type Grant Amount Range
(Threshold / Target / Max)
Performance Period Ends Final Vesting Date Exercise Price Amount Vested Amount Exercised / Expired
Doe, Jane
(CEO)
2/15/2027 PSUs 69,118 / 276,471 / 552,941 12/31/2029 2/15/2030 — — —
2/15/2026 PSUs 71,875 / 287,500 / 575,000 12/31/2028 2/15/2029 — — —
2/15/2025 PSUs 75,000 / 300,000 / 600,000 12/31/2027 2/15/2028 — — —
2/15/2024 PSUs 78,571 / 314,286 / 628,571 12/31/2026 2/15/2027 — 314,286 —
2/15/2027 Stock Options 1,382,353 — 2/15/2031 $17 — —
2/15/2026 Stock Options 1,437,500 — 2/15/2030 $16 — —
2/15/2025 Stock Options 1,500,000 — 2/15/2029 $15 — —
2/15/2024 Stock Options 1,571,429 — 2/15/2028 $14 — —
2/15/2023 Stock Options 1,653,846 — 2/15/2027 $13 1,653,846 —
2/15/2020 Stock Options 2,000,000 — 2/15/2024 $10 2,000,000 2,000,000

Farient’s view: We support the direction of these changes, but we note flaws in the definition of “earned compensation,” especially for understanding pay and performance alignment

Following the SEC Roundtable in June 2025, Farient wrote a comment letter to the SEC that recommended a clearer apples-to-apples calculation of granted and realized (i.e., earned) pay, rather than mixing pay definitions, as done in the SCT.

The SEC proposal separates what the Compensation Committee intended to deliver from what executives ultimately earn. This will give investors a clearer picture of pay for performance compared to the SCT and the PvP graphs / tables. However, there are inherent issues with the SEC’s selected definition of earned compensation, since pay and performance periods will not necessarily match. As noted in Farient’s 2012 White Paper “Pay Definitions: What Works Best in Pay for Performance Analysis,” which was cited as a reference by the SEC, realized pay can pick up grants from before the performance period begins and can overstate compensation when large, lumpy stock option exercises are made. A better approach is to provide data on realizable pay, which aligns pay and performance time horizons across long-term incentive (LTI) vehicles. (Farient will provide greater detail on a proposed definition in its upcoming comment letter to the SEC.)

There will also be transition issues. Investors, proxy advisors, issuers, and consultants have built methodologies around grant-date equity values, so a new definition of earned compensation could reduce historical comparability.

3. Make the CD&A requirement more principles-based

The SEC would significantly simplify the CD&A. Instead of seven required subjects and 15 example topics, companies would generally address three questions:

  • What are the objectives of the compensation program in relation to corporate strategy?
  • What are the material elements of compensation, and how are they determined?
  • [Where applicable] How did the most recent Say on Pay vote influence the company’s executive compensation decisions?

Farient’s view: We support simplifying the CD&A requirements while preserving companies’ flexibility to tell a clear and meaningful compensation story to shareholders

The CD&A was meant to explain how and why compensation decisions support each company’s strategy, rather than document compliance with a list of topics. Streamlining can help companies focus on the narrative and the considerations that drove the company’s decisions. Effective disclosure cannot be reduced to a formula. Companies will need the latitude to present their programs in a way that best reflects their strategy, performance framework, and shareholder context. The goal is not to produce a shorter CD&A, but a clearer story that links compensation and strategy.

However, shareholders may view this change negatively if it results in more questions than answers about pay programs and their link to shareholder interests.

4. Significantly simplify PvP Disclosure and substitute CAP for the new “Earned Compensation” pay definition

The SEC proposes replacing the CAP calculation in the PvP disclosure with Total Compensation Earned from the new Earned Compensation Table. This represents a significant simplification from the way companies have been reporting PvP since its launch in 2023.

Additionally, the proposed PvP disclosure would cover three rather than five years, apply only to the CEO and CFO, and use company cumulative TSR as the sole required measure. Net income, peer TSR, and a company-selected measure would generally fall away, although companies could voluntarily provide additional measures.

Farient’s view: We support simplification, but with an important caveat around pay definitions

Farient recommended simplifying PvP after the 2025 roundtable, including eliminating the average non-CEO NEO columns and making the company-selected measure optional. However, we also argued that CAP is useful in that it demonstrates the changing value of outstanding equity and pay-performance alignment. The proposing release cites Farient’s April 2026 comment letter that discussed how CAP is uniquely relevant for assessing management-shareholder alignment and its ongoing cost is now lower than it was initially.

The proposed Earned Compensation measure is easier to understand, but its focus on stock vesting and option exercise can create timing spikes that are unrelated to performance cycles. Given this, companies should consider whether supplemental realized or realizable-pay analysis remains useful.

5. Modernize perquisite disclosure, particularly executive security

The proposal would raise the aggregate perquisite reporting threshold from $10,000 to $150,000, meaning if an executive’s overall perquisites value in a given year does not reach $150,000, the executive’s perquisites value would not have to be reported. The SEC is also proposing a “de minimis tracking exclusion,” meaning that certain fringe benefits per IRS rules can be excluded when determining whether the $150,000 has been reached. This, in practical terms, means that companies would no longer have to track every small benefit solely for SEC reporting purposes.

The SEC wants to give companies more flexibility to determine, reasonably and in good faith, whether a benefit is integrally and directly related to an executive’s duties. It would also drop its categorical examples that define certain types of benefits as perquisites, meaning companies would have the discretion to determine whether executive security arrangements were related to business or personal needs.

The proposal would move away from requiring companies to separately identify and quantify individual perquisites, if their aggregate value is above a certain threshold. Companies would not need to identify individual perks unless they deem such disclosure is material information necessary to understand their executive compensation program. The SEC’s analysis anticipates that most individual perquisites would no longer be disclosed.

In the example around aircraft benefits, the value would need to be disclosed only if the executive’s aggregate perks exceed $150,000, and the benefit was not deemed to be business-related. While a description of the perks included in the aggregate value would need to be footnoted, an individual itemization of the aircraft benefit would not need to be in the footnote, unless deemed by the company to be material to shareholders’ understanding of the pay program.

Farient’s view: The added flexibility is constructive, particularly for security arrangements. However, there is significant ambiguity and possible differences around how business and personal needs will be defined

Where security is driven by a legitimate business need and supported by an appropriate assessment, it is reasonable to consider those costs as protecting the enterprise, rather than as a personal benefit. But flexibility should not become opacity. Significant personal benefits, particularly aircraft use, will remain areas of investor scrutiny. Companies should maintain strong governance over how benefits are classified, approved, and explained, and should disclose their determinative process.

6. Simplify the CEO Pay Ratio, Director Pay, and several other disclosures

The proposal would also streamline or eliminate several other longstanding compensation disclosures.

  • CEO Pay Ratio: The SEC would retain the CEO Pay Ratio disclosure, but it would define the median employee population around U.S. full-time employees, excluding seasonal and temporary employees, and would allow the median employee to be identified every five rather than every three years
  • Director compensation disclosure would become more principles-based. Companies would continue to disclose compensation earned by each Director, but without a prescribed tabular format or the current detailed requirements for deferred compensation
  • Termination payments: Companies would no longer be required to calculate and disclose the value of payments an executive would receive under various hypothetical termination or change-in-control scenarios. Instead, they would provide a principles-based narrative describing the material terms of those arrangements
  • Golden parachute disclosure would remain, but the SEC would consolidate the existing table into broader cash, equity, miscellaneous, and total compensation categories, and simplify the accompanying narrative
  • Pension benefits: for executives, the SEC would eliminate the separate Pension Benefits and Nonqualified Deferred Compensation tables, although relevant amounts, including pension service costs, company contributions to deferred compensation arrangements, and above-market earnings, would flow through to the new “Miscellaneous Compensation Received” column of the Earned Compensation Table
  • Option grant timing: disclosure of policies and practices around option grants made close in time to the release of material nonpublic information would be eliminated
  • Clawback-related checkboxes: the proposal would remove the annual report cover-page checkboxes on whether financial statements reflect an error correction and whether that correction required a clawback recovery analysis; it would also remove the requirement to explain why the recovery was not necessary

Together, the changes reflect the SEC’s broader move away from prescribed disclosures toward a framework focused on information that is considered to be material to investors.

Farient’s view: Farient generally supports simplifying disclosures where possible, which will likely enhance their usefulness to shareholders

  • CEO Pay Ratio: Farient supports simplifying the CEO Pay Ratio disclosure, which has provided limited useful information relative to its cost and complexity. The proposed changes should reduce administrative burdens
  • Director compensation: we do not support eliminating the Director Compensation Table as it provides a useful view of Director pay with limited effort
  • Termination payments: we do not support eliminating the disclosure of potential termination payments as this table provides a view of compensation arrangements and totals that inform investors whether programs are aligned with appropriate governance practices; investors want to understand if potential windfalls exist before termination actually occurs
  • Clawback-related checkboxes: We are not supportive of eliminating the clawback and restatement checkboxes. Whether a company has corrected a material error, evaluated compensation under its clawback policy, and determined whether recovery was required can inform shareholders’ assessment of accountability, Board oversight, and pay and performance alignment. Simplification should not reduce visibility into how companies address restatements and enforce recovery policies

Farient’s Overall Point of View: Less Required Disclosure Should Not Mean Less Governance

The most important distinction in the SEC proposal is between regulatory requirements and market expectations. For much of the public-company market, particularly the S&P 500 and larger Russell 3000 companies, SEC minimums are not the only standard that matters. Institutional investors and proxy advisors evaluate compensation programs and have their own sets of policies and standards.

That creates a potential trap: companies that treat the proposal as permission to remove information may find that investors still consider it important. For large public companies, we expect meaningful disclosure to be the better governance practice. For many, the approach will be to include more company-specific information, contextualized by ownership profile, compensation complexity, size, prior SOP outcomes, and investor expectations.

Reduced regulation also does not mean reduced scrutiny. Investor voting is becoming more fragmented among investors, making outcomes less predictable and making it important for companies to understand the expectations of their largest shareholders.

While the SEC may lower the disclosure floor. Investors will continue to influence the ceiling.

Implications for Companies

First, disclosure strategy should be a governance decision, rather than a compliance exercise. Companies may have considerably more discretion over what they disclose and how they explain it, making the judgment about what investors need more important, not less.

Second, market practice will likely begin to diverge, making comparisons more difficult. Some companies will likely preserve much of today’s disclosure; others will embrace the regulatory minimum. The most appropriate approach for any given issuer will differ by company.

Third, benchmarking of other executives will rely more on survey data instead of proxies. The impact may ultimately be constructive. Reduced visibility on pay beyond the CEO and CFO could mean lower pay inflation for executives.

Fourth, the use of special awards may become more widespread. Companies have been navigating the collision course between talent management and “good governance” as special awards are viewed unfavorably by investors and are visible if they are provided to any of the NEOs. Reporting on fewer NEOs will allow companies to grant special awards more freely, if needed, for strategic or retention purposes.

Finally, companies should expect investor and proxy advisor practices to evolve; they should plan for greater shareholder engagement.

Proxy advisors have built quantitative models around existing disclosure, and those methodologies will need to adapt. Until they do, companies may want to maintain supplemental information that helps investors interpret their pay decisions. Companies may also need to do more shareholder engagement to explain their pay decisions and understand what their largest investors still expect under any new disclosure rules.

What Boards and Compensation Committees Should Do

This is a proposal, not a final rule. The comment period will remain open for 60 days after Federal Register publication, the final rule will likely be published in 2027, and implementation would likely be for 2029 proxy statements (or 2028 at the earliest for companies choosing to opt in early). Between now and the 60-day deadline, companies should consider commenting on the proposal. Once the final rules come out, Boards and Compensation Committees can begin preparing for a potentially different disclosure regime.

1. Develop or refresh your disclosure philosophy before deciding what to cut

Ask what investors genuinely need to understand about executive compensation, rather than starting with a list of disclosures that may no longer be mandatory.

2. Model the proposed new Earned Compensation, Granted Compensation, and Status of Equity Tables, as well as the proposed new PvP and CEO Pay Ratio

For the CEO and CFO, compare target compensation, earned (realized) pay outcomes, and current SCT and pay values for the last three years. Where they diverge shows where explanatory disclosure matters most. The PvP changes may tell a different alignment story than before, so it will be good to get a handle on this early in case additional explanatory disclosure is needed.

3. Review disclosure beyond the CEO and CFO

Identify executives whose compensation disclosure would no longer be mandatory, but whose pay arrangements and/or equity transactions are currently disclosed in other filings, such as 8-Ks and Form 4s. Investors would likely rely on these forms more heavily going forward to understand pay beyond the CEO and CFO.

4. Revisit the CD&A from a new vantage point, and consider the investor’s perspective

The proposed changes will require a complete overhaul of the CD&A. Moreover, companies will be expected to explicitly connect compensation objectives to strategy. Committees should use this opportunity to start from the drawing board, and use the new CD&A to sharpen the line between realized pay and strategy, including measures, goals, leverage, and incentive outcomes.

5. Establish governance standards for perquisites and executive security

Greater regulatory flexibility puts the burden on Board judgment. Companies should have defensible, documented processes, including independent security assessments, where appropriate, for determining whether a benefit is business-related.

6. Engage with major shareholders before materially reducing disclosures

Gauge investor appetite for reduced disclosures before using regulatory relief aggressively, weighing investor expectations, peer practices, and the risk of investor frustration or adverse SOP votes.

The Bottom Line

Simpler rules alone will not create better disclosure. The most successful companies will use the flexibility to make their compensation story clearer, more strategic, and more useful, while preserving the information investors need to evaluate Board judgment and pay-for-performance alignment.

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